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Standard: Requirements for Linguistic and Physical
Definiteness of Patent Claims
Gary M. Fox*
Patent applicants must satisfy a variety of requirements to obtain a patent
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The definiteness re-
quirement forces applicants to describe their inventions in unambiguous terms
so that other inventors will understand the scope of granted patent rights.
Although the statutory provision for the definiteness requirement has been
stable for many years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus v. Biosig
Instruments altered the doctrine. The Court abrogated the Federal Circuit’s
insoluble-ambiguity standard and replaced it with a new reasonable-certainty
standard. Various district courts have applied the new standard in different
ways, indicating the need for further clarification. This Note argues that, fol-
lowing the establishment of the reasonable-certainty standard, courts may un-
derstand the definiteness requirement under a two-part framework of
linguistic and physical definiteness, which are both required for claims to be
definite. A claim fails the linguistic-definiteness requirement if it is open to
multiple constructions and one construction is not clearly correct. Addition-
ally, a claim fails the physical-definiteness requirement if it uses comparative
terms or involves ambiguous spatial relationships not limited to a narrow
range.
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Introduction
Imagine that you are trying to follow a recipe. The recipe directs you to
separate three eggs. It tells you to “place one half of the separated eggs into a
bowl” and “discard the remaining half.” After adding the other ingredients
and transferring everything to a pan, the recipe instructs you to “place the
pan some distance away from the center of the oven” for proper cooking.
This recipe requires you to fill in some gaps. First, it requires you to decide
whether to use the yolks and discard the whites or to use the whites and
discard the yolks. Then, when the time comes to put the pan in the oven,
you must judge how far from the center is an appropriate distance. You
could place the pan only a couple of inches from the center, or you could
place it very near the edge of the oven rack. Perhaps your experience with
other recipes will provide you with clues for solving these problems. But, on
its face, the recipe is ambiguous, and you might reject it as unhelpful.
A patent applicant must avoid some of the same problems with ambigu-
ity as the author of this recipe. To obtain patent protection, an inventor
must first submit an application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).1 The application must conform to the provisions in the Patent
Act2: It must include both a description of the invention3 and claims spelling
out the inventor’s rights.4 The application must “conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”5 This definiteness require-
ment forces inventors to delineate the metes and bounds of patent claims so
that the public has sufficient notice as to which parts of the field remain
open to future inventors.6 If the applicant fails to specify sufficiently definite
claims, then the USPTO will refuse to grant the patent, leaving the inventor
without any protection for the ideas contained in the application.
Recently, the Supreme Court has shown a remarkable interest in patent
law.7 From 1982 through 2000, the Court heard only eight patent cases.8 But
particularly AP, DJP, EHK, and my friends in the Volume 116 Articles Office—for their
support.
1. See generally Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and
Policy: Cases and Materials 51–54 (6th ed. 2013) (describing the process of patent
prosecution).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (making the grant of patent rights “subject to the condi-
tions and requirements” of 35 U.S.C.). Generally, the “Patent Act” refers to the provisions
contained in Title 35 of the United States Code.
3. Id. § 112(a).
4. Id. § 112(b).
5. Id.
6. See discussion infra Section I.A.
7. Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
430, 431 (2015).
8. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 1, at 11 & nn.34–35.
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since 2000, it has heard more than two dozen patent cases.9 Plus, the Court
has started hearing types of patent cases that it has not heard in a long time.
For example, the Court’s recent decision in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple
Inc.10 was the first time in more than 100 years that the Court granted certi-
orari for a design-patent case.11 Commentators have speculated about the
driving force behind the Court’s renewed interest in patent law.12 Regardless
of the underlying reasons, in 2014, the Court’s interest led it to recalibrate
the definiteness requirement in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.
(Nautilus II).13
The implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus II are still
not completely clear. On a fundamental level, the Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s “insoluble ambiguity” standard for definiteness, holding that it is
not enough for a court to be able to give a claim any meaning.14 Instead, the
Court held that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) must
understand the invention’s scope “with reasonable certainty.”15 But the legal
system is still working out how to apply the Court’s holding. Some com-
mentators have stated that the new standard is just the old standard in a
different form.16 District courts have applied the new standard in different
ways.17 And despite its patent expertise, even the Federal Circuit conceded
that it did not completely understand how to move forward under the new
standard.18 Courts, parties involved in patent litigation, and inventors would
benefit from a more detailed framework for the definiteness requirement.
This Note argues that courts might understand the Supreme Court’s
reasonable-certainty standard for the definiteness requirement under a
framework with two necessary elements: linguistic definiteness and physical
definiteness. Part I reviews the definiteness requirement by discussing its
9. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
Theory 62, 63–64 (2013) (counting twenty-four patent cases at the Supreme Court between
2000 and 2012).
10. 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
11. Adam Liptak & Vindu Goel, Supreme Court Offers No Clear Answer in Samsung-Apple
Patent Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2016, at B2, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/technol-
ogy/samsung-apple-smartphone-patent-supreme-court.html?mcubz=0 (on file with the Mich-
igan Law Review) (“The Supreme Court had not heard a design patent case in over a
century.”). Unlike a utility patent granted under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the USPTO may grant a
design patent for a “new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35
U.S.C. § 171(a) (Supp. I 2013). For simplicity, this Note uses the word “patent” to refer to
utility patents.
12. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 9.
13. 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
14. See Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
15. Id.
16. See discussion infra Section II.A.
17. See discussion infra Section II.B.
18. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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purpose, statutory grounding, and judicial standards before and after Nauti-
lus. Part II examines how lower courts have applied the definiteness require-
ment in different ways since the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus II.
Part III suggests that courts analyzing definiteness under the reasonable-cer-
tainty standard might apply a two-part framework based on linguistic defi-
niteness and physical definiteness.
I. Development of the Definiteness Requirement
Although patent law’s definiteness requirement has existed for many
years, the Supreme Court’s recent articulation of a new standard altered the
doctrine. This Part reviews the development of the definiteness requirement
in its statutory and judicial contexts. Section I.A examines the textual basis
for and goals of the definiteness requirement. Section I.B explains how the
Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus II shifted the standard for definiteness
in the lower courts.
A. Statutory Grounding and Purpose
The Patent Act outlines the requirements that patent applications must
meet for USPTO approval. It includes four disclosure requirements whose
names track their textual hooks: the enablement, written-description, best-
mode, and definiteness requirements.19 To fulfill the definiteness require-
ment, an application must “conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . .
regards as the invention.”20
From its inception, the U.S. patent law system has included a definite-
ness requirement in some form.21 Historically, the Court’s articulation of the
definiteness requirement emphasized providing “the public” with sufficient
notice of precisely what the applicant had patented.22 The modern articula-
tion of this requirement survives in the Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).23
19. To satisfy the enablement requirement, an application must “enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use” the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). To meet the
written-description and best-mode requirements, an application must provide “a written
description of the invention” and “set forth the best mode . . . of carrying out the invention,”
respectively. Id.
20. Id. § 112(b) (emphasis added).
21. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 1, at 316 (“This principle has deep roots.”).
22. Nearly 200 years ago, the Supreme Court interpreted a section of the 1793 Patent Act
regarding disclosure in Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433–34 (1822). In that case, the
Court found that one “object of the specification is[ ] to put the public in possession of what
the party claims as his own invention.” Id. at 434. Over 100 years later, in Permutit Co. v.
Graver Corp., the Court stated that patent applicants are required “to inform the public during
the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted.” 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (affirming
the invalidation of claims for failing to meet this requirement).
23. The U.S. patent system recently shifted from a first-to-invent regime to a first-inven-
tor-to-file regime, but this shift did not alter the definiteness requirement. Congress amended
the definiteness requirement’s statutory provision slightly when it passed the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in
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From the early days of the U.S. patent system until now, the definiteness
requirement has functioned to alert the public, in unambiguous terms, of
the patentee’s rights.
One can think about patent claim terms as functioning similarly to
fences. Just as fences indicate physical boundaries in the realm of real prop-
erty, claim terms demarcate the conceptual boundaries of a patented inven-
tion.24 The definiteness requirement ensures that patent applicants clearly
describe the metes and bounds of their claims.25 What is not claimed is just
as important as what is claimed because other inventors will want to know
which areas of technology are still available to them for patenting.26 Put an-
other way, other inventors will want to know whether there is still space in
the field for them to invent without infringing on the patentee’s rights.27
B. Standards Before and After Nautilus
Although the statutory provision for definiteness has been stable for
many years, the Supreme Court’s interest in the doctrine and recent articu-
lation of the judicial standard have brought about changes in the law. The
Court’s changes have had a significant impact on the lower courts.
Before Nautilus II, district courts followed the Federal Circuit’s insolu-
ble-ambiguity standard as articulated in Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software,
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). Even so, the language has remained relatively constant for
many years. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125
(2014) (“The 1870 Act’s definiteness requirement survives today, largely unaltered.”); see also
Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System of Invention Registration:
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 24, 24 (2011),
http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol110/iss1/2/ [https://perma.cc/67V3-EPR2] (noting
that the AIA “represents the most significant legislative event affecting patent law and practice
in more than half a century”). Before the AIA, the relevant statutory provision included a
reference to what “the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). After the
AIA, the provision now refers to what “the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the inven-
tion.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). Evidently, this change was only meant to use gender-neutral
language and add the possibility of a joint inventor. In fact, the Supreme Court noted in
Nautilus II that the definiteness requirement under the AIA is the same as the definiteness
requirement under the previous version of the Patent Act. 134 S. Ct. at 2125 n.1 (acknowledg-
ing that the AIA “modified [35 U.S.C.] §§ 112 and 282 in minor respects not pertinent here”).
24. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 1, at 316 (“[I]ndefinite claims do not give clear
warning about the patentee’s property rights. They fail to inform passersby whether they are
trespassing or not.”). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Re-
thinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1748 (2009) (“The idea behind
peripheral claiming . . . was to establish the ‘metes and bounds’ of the invention in a manner
analogous to real property deeds. But any analogy between patent boundaries and real prop-
erty boundaries is no more than an analogy, and a flawed analogy at that.”).
25. MPEP § 2173.02(I) (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
26. See Permutit, 284 U.S. at 60 (reasoning that other inventors may want to know
“which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not”).
27. Those who tread on a patentee’s rights are liable for infringement, regardless of
whether they knew about the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (making no mention of a scienter
requirement).
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Inc.28 The Datamize court considered whether a claim using the term “aes-
thetically pleasing” in a software patent was sufficiently definite.29 Ulti-
mately, the court held that the claim was indefinite because there was no
“objective way to determine whether the look and feel of an interface screen
is ‘aesthetically pleasing.’ ”30 The Datamize court stated that “[o]nly claims
‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous’ are indefinite.”31 In
other words, the court found that claims are definite as long as they “can be
given any reasonable meaning.”32 The court further noted that “[t]he defi-
niteness requirement . . . does not compel absolute clarity.”33
Generally, claim terms have easily surpassed this low bar. A recent, em-
pirical study of disclosure requirement cases during the pre-Nautilus era
demonstrates this trend.34 Professors John R. Allison and Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette found that, before 2014, courts rejected the majority of definite-
ness challenges as a matter of law.35 In fact, courts invalidated claims in
response to definiteness challenges in only 17% of cases.36 In other words,
courts easily held that claim terms had at least one “reasonable meaning.”37
The Federal Circuit relied on the same insoluble-ambiguity standard
when it decided Nautilus I.38 In that case, the court considered a claim for a
heart-rate monitor used in exercise equipment.39 While exercising, users
gripped an “elongate member” containing electrodes in a “spaced relation-
ship with each other” that detected electromyogram (EMG) and electrocar-
diograph (ECG) signals.40 The parties disputed whether the term “spaced
28. 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. 2120.
29. Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1344–45.
30. Id. at 1356.
31. Id. at 1347 (first citing Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2003); then citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2003); and then citing Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134
S. Ct. 2120 (2014)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definite-
ness and Disclosure, 65 Duke L.J. 609, 645 fig.5 (2016).
35. Id.
36. Id. Out of 673 total cases, 109 cases resulted in invalidity for indefiniteness as a
matter of law, and only 6 cases resulted in invalidity for indefiniteness as a matter of fact. Id.
37. Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1347.
38. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus I), 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
39. Id. at 894–95. Biosig’s patent offered an improvement over the prior art because it
subtracted EMG signals from ECG signals to calculate users’ heart rates more accurately. Id. at
894.
40. Id. at 895 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 col. 5 ll. 20,
28–29).
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relationship” was sufficiently definite.41 Identifying the relevant legal stan-
dard, the court stated that “[a] claim is indefinite only when it is ‘not ame-
nable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous.’ ”42 The court held that the
claim did “not suffer from indefiniteness” because a PHOSITA would be-
lieve that the claim was sufficiently bounded.43
On certiorari in Nautilus II, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Cir-
cuit’s decision and articulated a new standard for definiteness.44 The Court
replaced the Federal Circuit’s insoluble-ambiguity standard with a new rea-
sonable-certainty standard.45 Although Congress had not substantively
changed the statutory provision,46 the Court found that the insoluble-ambi-
guity standard was not “probative of the essential inquiry”47 and permitted
issuance of too many indefinite claims.48 The Court established the new
standard: “[W]e hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims,
read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution
history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention.”49 Reasonable certainty of a claim’s scope
is now the touchstone for courts evaluating whether claims are sufficiently
definite.50
To arrive at this standard, the Court balanced two competing interests.
First, the Court acknowledged that “the definiteness requirement must take
into account the inherent limitations of language.”51 In other words, innova-
tion requires at least slight flexibility in the claims.52 Second, the Court rec-
ognized that claims should provide the public with “clear notice” of the
41. Id. at 897.
42. Id. at 898 (emphasis added) (quoting Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1347).
43. Id. at 888–89. Given its analysis under the insoluble-ambiguity standard, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
904–05.
44. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2131 (2014).
45. Id. at 2124.
46. See discussion supra Section I.A.
47. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 517 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)).
48. See id. at 2124 (“We conclude that the Federal Circuit’s formulation, which tolerates
some ambiguous claims but not others, does not satisfy the statute’s definiteness
requirement.”).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. In some cases, patent drafters may use “functional language” to write “means-plus-
function” claims. Merges & Duffy, supra note 1, at 331–35. Courts analyze means-plus-
function claims for definiteness using a different standard. See, e.g., Media Rights Techs., Inc.
v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reviewing the patent to
determine whether the patentee “disclose[d] [an] adequate corresponding structure to per-
form all of the claimed functions”). Such means-plus-function claims are beyond the scope of
this Note.
51. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2128.
52. Id. (“Some modicum of uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate
incentives for innovation.’ ” (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002))).
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inventor’s intellectual property rights.53 The Court did not want to foster
“[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter
only at the risk of infringement claims.”54 The Court’s reasonable-certainty
standard is a compromise between these competing interests.
II. Uncertainty Regarding the Definiteness Requirement
Since the Supreme Court altered the definiteness requirement by intro-
ducing the reasonable-certainty standard in Nautilus II, the lower courts
have attempted to work out the implications of that standard. This Part ar-
gues that the lower courts have not been consistent in applying the reasona-
ble-certainty standard. Section II.A refutes the idea that the reasonable-
certainty standard is merely the insoluble-ambiguity standard under a differ-
ent guise. Section II.B examines how the district courts have applied the new
standard in different ways. Lastly, Section II.C concludes with a brief assess-
ment of how the Federal Circuit has grappled with the standard.
A. A New Standard
In Nautilus II, the Supreme Court sought to strengthen the definiteness
requirement by providing lower courts with a purportedly clear decision.55
The Court unquestionably abrogated the Federal Circuit’s precedent of rely-
ing on the standard of insoluble ambiguity, or amenity to construction, and
replaced it with a new standard.56 The Court recognized that definiteness
involves a tension between “the inherent limitations of language” and “clear
notice” for inventors.57 Yet the Court did not provide any further guidance
about how the lower courts should strike this balance.58 The Court left the
lower courts to try their best to apply the new standard.
Some commentators have argued that the reasonable-certainty standard
merely rephrases the insoluble-ambiguity standard. The idea that the stan-
dards function identically was appealing to academics and courts immedi-
ately after the decision came down, especially because the Federal Circuit’s
53. Id. at 2129; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
54. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2129 (alteration in original) (quoting United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
55. See id. at 2130 (attempting to avoid standards that might “breed lower court confu-
sion” and to provide courts with “a reliable compass”).
56. Id. at 2124 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s formulation . . . does not satisfy the statute’s
definiteness requirement.”).
57. Id. at 2128–29; see also supra text accompanying notes 51–54.
58. The Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for application of the new stan-
dard without expressing any opinion on the merits. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2131 (“[W]e
decline to apply the standard we have announced to the controversy between Nautilus and
Biosig.”).
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ruling on remand in Nautilus III matched its ruling in Nautilus I.59 In Nauti-
lus III, the court once again held that the term “spaced relationship” was
sufficiently definite—this time under the new reasonable-certainty stan-
dard.60 Professor Jason Rantanen, a patent law scholar, posited that the Su-
preme Court’s intervening ruling effected little change in the Federal
Circuit’s analysis of claim definiteness.61 He noted that, between 2014 (when
Nautilus II came down) and 2015, the Federal Circuit held only one claim
indefinite under the reasonable-certainty standard.62 Some courts, which
had become accustomed to applying the old standard, also suggested that
the reasonable-certainty standard may function essentially like the insoluble-
ambiguity standard.63
But the Federal Circuit has ruled conclusively against this view. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus II, the Federal Circuit had an opportu-
nity to reconsider its ruling in Dow Chemical Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp.
(Canada).64 Although the court had initially found the claims definite, the
court admitted that its “original decision would have been different under
the new Nautilus standard.”65 The court remarked that “there can be no
serious question that Nautilus changed the law of indefiniteness.”66 After re-
considering the claims in light of the new standard, the court held that they
were indefinite.67 This case is a clear indication that the reasonable-certainty
standard sets a higher bar for definiteness than the insoluble-ambiguity stan-
dard did.
Lower courts and practitioners still do not know, however, exactly how
high the Supreme Court raised the bar. In Nautilus II, the Supreme Court
emphasized that its decision focused on articulating the correct standard—
not reviewing the circuit court’s substantive analysis for the definiteness
challenge.68 After the decision, one district court noted that, “[p]roperly
59. Compare Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus I), 715 F.3d 891, 898
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disputed term ‘spaced relationship’ does not suffer from indefinite-
ness.”), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014), with Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nauti-
lus III), 783 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (“[W]e maintain our reversal of the district court’s
determination that Biosig’s patent claims are indefinite.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
60. Nautilus III, 783 F.3d at 1384.
61. Rantanen, supra note 7, at 432 (“It seems to be business as usual at the Federal
Circuit.”).
62. Id. at 439–40. Professor Rantanen went so far as to say that the Federal Circuit’s
“application of Nautilus suggests a lowered bar for claim definiteness.” Id. at 439.
63. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
64. 803 F.3d 620, 626–31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that the doctrines of claim and issue
preclusion did not prevent the court from reconsidering the definiteness challenge). The case
involved claims for particular kinds of plastics. Dow Chem., 803 F.3d at 624. For further dis-
cussion of this case, see infra note 118.
65. Dow Chem., 803 F.3d at 631.
66. Id. at 630.
67. Id. at 635.
68. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130–31
(2014).
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read, Nautilus was about the Federal Circuit’s phrasing of the test for indefi-
niteness.”69 The phrases “insoluble ambiguity” and “reasonable certainty”
set different thresholds for definiteness, but neither seems to be imbued with
any meaningful content. The reasonable-certainty standard is higher than
the insoluble-ambiguity standard, but the extent of the difference will only
become apparent as courts continue to apply the new standard.
B. The District Courts’ Applications
The new standard in Nautilus II changed the law for district courts,
which have not completely adjusted to the change. In recent cases, district
courts’ approaches have ranged from relying on definiteness instead of other
disclosure requirements, applying the old standard for definiteness, and ap-
plying the new standard in a variety of ways. Ideally, district courts would
apply the new standard consistently to avoid unpredictable results.
The definiteness requirement can be difficult to apply, and some district
courts have inappropriately used it to invalidate claims that fail other provi-
sions of the Patent Act. For instance, in Invensys Systems, Inc. v. Emerson
Electric Co., a district court held that a claim was indefinite, but the court
should have invalidated the claim on other grounds for lack of enablement
and lack of operable utility.70 The case involved “devices that measure the
properties . . . of fluids flowing through a conduit,” called Coriolis flowme-
ters.71 Among other issues, the court considered whether a claim using the
phrase “calculating dot products” was indefinite because the calculation
could not always be performed.72 The court identified the applicable reason-
able-certainty standard but noted that Nautilus was not factually analo-
gous.73 The problem with the claim, however, was not related to definiteness;
the patentee had in fact specified the metes and bounds of the claim. In fact,
the court acknowledged that the claim was “unambiguous.”74 Instead, the
69. R-Boc Reps., Inc. v. Minemyer, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis
added). The court also said, “How ‘new and powerful’ the standard announced in Nautilus [is]
remains  to be seen. Commentators are not united on it being as drastic a change as [the
plaintiff] suggests . . . .” Id. at 1126.
70. See No. 6:12–cv–799, 2014 WL 3976371, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014). For the
definition of the enablement requirement, see supra note 19. Under the operability require-
ment, an invention must “actually accomplish the utility alleged by the inventor.” Merges &
Duffy, supra note 1, at 210. When an invention does not meet the operability requirement,
the USPTO’s “current practice is to rely on both § 101 (no utility) and § 112 ¶ 1 [AIA
§ 112(a)] (failure to enable) in rejecting the application.” Id.
71. Invensys Sys., 2014 WL 3976371, at *1.
72. Id. at *4. The full term that the court construed was “calculating dot products of said
normalized pulsation and said signals from said first pick-off sensor and said second pick-off
sensor to translate said signals to said center frequency.” Id. It was impossible to calculate a dot
product for the normalized pulsation and signals because dot products require two sequences
of numbers, but the normalized pulsation was only a single value. Id.
73. See id. at *5 (“This is not a situation where, as in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc., there is a term potentially open to multiple interpretations.” (citation omitted)).
74. Id.
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court should have found that the impossible calculation caused the claim to
fail the Patent Act’s operability and enablement requirements. Courts could
benefit from a framework for definiteness in the post-Nautilus era so that
they do not use the definiteness doctrine to invalidate claims suffering from
other deficiencies.
Where cases appropriately involve definiteness analysis, some courts still
question whether the reasonable-certainty standard differs from the insolu-
ble-ambiguity standard. For example, one district court expressed its doubts
in Boston Scientific Corp. v. Cook Inc.75 Although the court conceded that the
reasonable-certainty standard might be dispositive in some cases, it still
found that “the relevant inquiry remains the same.”76 For courts trained to
rely on precedent, conflation of the two standards may be enticing. When
confronted with the new standard, courts may revert to their current under-
standings rather than rethinking them in light of the new standard.
Even district courts that have recognized the novelty of the reasonable-
certainty standard may struggle to apply it. For example, in Crane Security
Technologies, Inc. v. Rolling Optics AB, a district court considered whether
the term “optical effect” was sufficiently definite.77 The court identified the
reasonable-certainty standard at the beginning of its definiteness analysis.78
Later in its opinion, however, the court found that the term was definite but
made no mention of the articulated standard.79 The court ultimately held
that “optical effect” was definite because it was “amenable to construction
according to its plain terms.”80 The court’s use of the “amenable to con-
struction” language is a reversion to the abrogated insoluble-ambiguity stan-
dard.81 Although the result might have remained the same under the new
standard, the court should have explicitly considered whether a PHOSITA
would understand the term “optical effect” with reasonable certainty.82
Courts need to apply the reasonable-certainty standard to ensure that they
reach results that are consistent with Nautilus II.
Additionally, district courts may have a difficult time deciding cases us-
ing the reasoning that the Supreme Court presented in Nautilus II. In Veloc-
ity Patent LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, a district court held that the
claim term “insufficient engine speed” was definite.83 The court noted that,
although there was no threshold for the engine speed, “[s]ome modicum of
75. 187 F. Supp. 3d 249 (D. Mass. 2016).
76. Bos. Sci., 187 F. Supp. 3d at 271.
77. 166 F. Supp. 3d 76, 91–92 (D. Mass. 2016).
78. Crane Sec., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (quoting the holding from Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)).
79. Id. at 92.
80. Id.
81. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130
(2014) (“It cannot be sufficient that a court can ascribe some meaning to a patent’s
claims . . . .”).
82. See id. at 2124 (establishing the correct standard).
83. No. 13-cv-8413, 2016 WL 5234110, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016).
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uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for inno-
vation.’ ”84 The court engaged with the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind
the standard from Nautilus II, but its analysis was brief.85 The court just as
easily could have seized on the other competing interest from the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Nautilus II and held that such a phrase does not “afford
clear notice of what is claimed.”86 Indeed, failing to specify a speed range
could leave a PHOSITA within the “zone of uncertainty” that the Supreme
Court sought to avoid.87 Ultimately, the court still might have reached an
appropriate result, but this example shows why courts need more guidance
on how to analyze claims for definiteness. Otherwise, courts might be
tempted to rely on cursory recitations of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Nautilus II to justify whether they find claims to be sufficiently definite.
Lastly, district courts could also benefit from a definiteness framework
because the decision in Nautilus II abrogated the Federal Circuit’s insoluble-
ambiguity standard without explaining the implications for earlier prece-
dents. Because the Supreme Court raised the bar in Nautilus II, previous
cases finding claims insolubly ambiguous are still persuasive because the
same claims would still be indefinite under the reasonable-certainty stan-
dard. Nevertheless, it is not clear which prior cases still apply and to what
extent they remain good law. One district court has held that Nautilus II
“does not render all of the prior Federal Circuit and district court cases
inapplicable.”88 And the Supreme Court hinted that, although the Federal
Circuit’s standard was incorrect, its inquiries were not wildly off track.89 Yet
the Court was not clear about whether the Federal Circuit should revisit
issues of definiteness that arose under the insoluble-ambiguity standard.90
In a variety of cases, district courts have used definiteness in lieu of
other statutory requirements, declined to apply the new standard for defi-
niteness, and cursorily applied the new standard. One would expect the Fed-
eral Circuit to provide lower courts with more clarity.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Response
Although the district courts have not consistently applied the reasona-
ble-certainty standard, one might expect that the Federal Circuit would fare
better. Despite its patent law expertise, however, the Federal Circuit has not
yet provided meaningful guidance to the lower courts for applying the rea-
sonable-certainty standard.
84. Velocity Patent, 2016 WL 5234110, at *5 (quoting Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2128).
85. See id.
86. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
87. Id. at 2130 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236
(1942)).
88. Freeny v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13–CV–00361–WCB, 2014 WL 4294505, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 28, 2014).
89. See Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 (noting that application of the insoluble ambiguity
standard may have “track[ed] the statutory prescription”).
90. See id. (remaining silent on revisitation of previous cases).
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Immediately following Nautilus II, the Federal Circuit did not expound
on the Supreme Court’s reasonable-certainty standard. On remand in Nau-
tilus III, the Federal Circuit reanalyzed the disputed patent claim with the
term “spaced relationship” under the new standard.91 The Federal Circuit
wryly remarked that it could “now steer by the bright star of ‘reasonable
certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity.’ ”92
The court followed up this comment with a discussion of how “ ‘reasonable
certainty’ has been defined in broad spectra of the law,” including a lengthy
footnote with a list of cases referencing reasonable certainty.93 This reaction
shows that the Federal Circuit finds the reasonable-certainty standard just as
amorphous as the insoluble-ambiguity standard. This reaction is under-
standable, especially considering that the Supreme Court’s decision in Nau-
tilus II noted that the insoluble-ambiguity standard may have been “a
shorthand label for a more probing inquiry that the Federal Circuit ap-
plie[d] in practice.”94 The Court’s comment only adds to confusion about
how much the reasonable-certainty standard really differs from the insolu-
ble-ambiguity standard.95
Despite confusion in the lower courts since Nautilus III, the Federal Cir-
cuit still has not offered much to clarify the reasonable-certainty standard
during the past few years. Because the Federal Circuit consists of judges who
hear many patent cases,96 one might expect that the court would explain its
view of the Supreme Court’s standard and flesh out details to make the
doctrine more workable. Yet the court has declined to do so, even though it
has explicitly acknowledged these ambiguities.97 Although the court’s deci-
sions are binding precedent on the district courts, its decisions have not
articulated a framework for definiteness that might serve as a general start-
ing point for definiteness analysis. District courts would benefit from a more
detailed view of the reasonable-certainty standard so that they do not feel
lost at sea with only the “bright star” of Nautilus to guide them.
III. Two Requirements for Definiteness
One way to develop a framework for understanding the definiteness re-
quirement is to review the Federal Circuit’s decisions during the post-Nauti-
lus era for helpful patterns. This Part contends that, following the Supreme
91. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus III), 783 F.3d 1374, 1379–84 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
92. Id. at 1379.
93. Id. at 1379–80, 1380 n.2 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928)).
94. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2130.
95. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
97. See Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 656 F. App’x 504, 527 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (noting that the court has “not clarified the relationship between ‘insolubly ambiguous’
and ‘reasonably certain’ ”).
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Court’s decision in Nautilus II, courts may understand the definiteness re-
quirement as two separate, necessary requirements: linguistic definiteness
and physical definiteness. Section III.A asserts that claims open to only one
construction are linguistically definite, but claims open to more than one
construction are generally invalid because they are linguistically indefinite.
Under this approach, claims with multiple constructions are linguistically
definite only if a PHOSITA would believe that one construction is clearly
correct. Section III.B posits that claims with comparative terms or ambigu-
ous spatial relationships between claim elements fail to meet the physical-
definiteness requirement unless a PHOSITA would be practically limited to a
narrow range of options. Under the proposed two-part framework, courts
would hold invalid a claim that fails to meet either the linguistic-definiteness
requirement or the physical-definiteness requirement.
A. Linguistic Definiteness
When evaluating whether a claim meets the reasonable-certainty stan-
dard after Nautilus, courts may first consider whether the claim is linguisti-
cally definite. Generally, a claim meets the requirement of linguistic
definiteness when it is open to only one construction. The case of only one
possible construction is easy because a PHOSITA will be reasonably certain
of the claimed invention’s metes and bounds. But when patent claims may
be construed in more than one way, linguistic definiteness concerns arise.
A claim that can be construed in only one way is linguistically definite.
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus II, the Federal Circuit
held that a claim was definite because a PHOSITA would understand the
claim terms. In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., the court considered
claims on “systems and methods of generating a composite web page that
combines certain visual elements of a ‘host’ website with content of a third-
party merchant.”98 The appellant sought to invalidate the claims because
they used the term “look and feel,” which the appellant thought was indefi-
nite.99 The court held that the claims withstood the definiteness challenge
under the reasonable-certainty standard.100 It noted that, although the appel-
lant “attempt[ed] to characterize ‘look and feel’ as purely subjective, the evi-
dence demonstrates that ‘look and feel’ had an established, sufficiently
objective meaning in the art.”101 Because the claim used terms that could be
98. 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
99. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259. The court held that it need not reach the issue of
whether “look and feel” is sufficiently definite in one of the disputed patents because it had
already invalidated that patent on other grounds. Id. But the court construed the term “visu-
ally perceptible elements” to mean “ ‘look and feel’ elements that can be seen” and therefore
considered the meaning of “look and feel” anyway. Id. at 1259–60.
100. Id. at 1261.
101. Id. at 1260. In fact, the meaning was so well established that the appellant admitted
during trial that both the company and its customers knew the meaning of that term. Id. at
1261. If the company and laypeople understood what the term meant, then surely a PHOSITA
would also comprehend it.
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interpreted in only one way, the inventor satisfied the statutory obligation of
“particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter” of the
invention.102 In short, the Federal Circuit’s decision in DDR Holdings dem-
onstrates that claims with only one possible construction withstand review
under the reasonable-certainty standard because they are linguistically
definite.103
In contrast, a claim is not linguistically definite when it is open to more
than one possible construction. Multiple constructions are problematic be-
cause they indicate that the patent is not “precise enough to afford clear
notice of what is claimed.”104 Unlike claims open to only one possible con-
struction, claims open to multiple interpretations demonstrate that the pat-
ent drafter has not met the statutory obligation of “particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter” warranting protection.105 The ex-
ception is where a claim is open to more than one construction but one
construction must be the right choice.
Claims open to multiple constructions are generally invalid for linguistic
indefiniteness. But the Federal Circuit has held that this ambiguity may be
overcome if a PHOSITA would find that one of the possible constructions is
clearly correct. For example, in Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., the
court held that the claim was definite despite two possible constructions.106
In a patent for liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturing processes, the
contested claim included the phrase “a contact hole for source wiring and
gate wiring connection terminals.”107 The parties disagreed over whether this
phrase meant two contact holes (one for a source-wiring connection termi-
nal and one for a gate-wiring connection terminal) or a single contact hole
(shared between the source-wiring and gate-wiring connection terminals).108
The court held that the claim was sufficiently definite because a PHOSITA
would know that the former construction must be correct.109 The court rea-
soned that there was no indication that the patentee was attempting to di-
verge from standard industry practice for this claim element; in fact,
development of a shared contact hole would have been a new development
102. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
103. Of course, a court’s finding that a claim meets the linguistic-definiteness requirement
does not mean that the claim is valid. The court might still find that the claim is invalid for
physical indefiniteness, see discussion infra Section III.B, or for any other grounds in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. Linguistic definiteness is a necessary condition for claim validity; it
is not sufficient.
104. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).
105. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
106. 779 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
107. Eidos Display, 779 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Patent No.
5,879,958 col. 58 ll. 40–41).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1365 (“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would understand the limita-
tion-at-issue to call for separate, different contact holes for the source wiring connection ter-
minals and gate wiring connection terminals, rather than one shared contact hole.”).
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in the industry, warranting a more explicit disclosure.110 Consequently, al-
though the claim seemed linguistically indefinite at first, the claim met the
reasonable-certainty standard because one construction was clearly correct.
A court is more likely to find that a claim open to three or more con-
structions is linguistically indefinite than a claim open to two constructions.
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva II), the Federal Cir-
cuit had to interpret the meaning of the term “molecular weight” in a claim
for a method of making a polymer.111 The court noted that the term can
have three different meanings, each calculated in a different manner.112 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the claim was invalid for lack of definiteness,
partially because there was conflicting evidence about which definition of
“molecular weight” the patentee intended.113 Crucially, the claim did not
have one construction that a PHOSITA would have found clearly correct.114
One expert witness even conceded that none of the three options are consid-
ered the default molecular weight.115 Because no construction stood out
from the others, the claim fell short of the reasonable-certainty standard.
As the number of possible claim constructions increases, the chances
that a claim will be invalidated for linguistic indefiniteness rise sharply. With
more claim constructions, it becomes even harder for the inventor to show
that a PHOSITA would find one of the constructions to be clearly correct.
The Federal Circuit found a claim with two possible constructions suffi-
ciently definite in Eidos Display, given how a PHOSITA would view those
constructions,116 and it may be easy enough to imagine that a court would
similarly find a claim with three possible constructions sufficiently defi-
nite.117 Beyond three constructions, the idea that a PHOSITA would find one
110. Id.
111. 789 F.3d 1335, 1338–40 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Although the Federal Circuit had previ-
ously ruled on the merits, the Supreme Court vacated that decision because it held that the
Federal Circuit had improperly reviewed the district court’s factual findings. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (Teva I), 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (“We hold that the appellate
court must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review.”). The Supreme Court
instructed the Federal Circuit to reconsider the indefiniteness challenge under the proper stan-
dard of review on remand. Id. at 843.
112. Teva II, 789 F.3d at 1338. The three options are peak average molecular weight, num-
ber average molecular weight, and weight average molecular weight. Id. The three different
molecular weights correspond to different points on a curve of chromatogram data. See id. at
1345 (“The district court fact findings regarding how one of skill in the art would understand
the way in which a curve created with chromatogram data reflects molecular weights was not
clearly erroneous.”).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1341 (“[T]he claim on its face offers no guidance on which measure of
‘molecular weight’ the claims cover.”).
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
117. For example, consider Teva II with slightly modified facts where one method of cal-
culating the slope was almost always used in the plastics industry.
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construction clearly correct becomes largely unbelievable.118 As the Supreme
Court hoped in Nautilus II, this framework would incentivize inventors to
draft their claims as precisely as possible.119 The framework would motivate
patent drafters to “afford clear notice of what is claimed” and accordingly
alert other inventors as to the field in which they may decide to operate.120
Therefore, viewing linguistic definiteness as part of the overall definiteness
requirement is in line with the overall goal of claiming in the patent system.
These cases illustrate how linguistic indefiniteness may arise when a
claim is open to multiple constructions. In that case, the claim is only lin-
guistically definite if a PHOSITA would find that one of those constructions
is clearly correct. As the number of possible constructions increases, a claim
is more likely to be found invalid for failing to meet the definiteness
requirement.
B. Physical Definiteness
An ambiguous claim may not always suffer from linguistic indefinite-
ness. When considering whether a claim meets Nautilus’s reasonable-cer-
tainty standard under the proposed two-part framework, courts may also
evaluate whether the claim is physically definite. To be physically definite, a
claim must be practically limited to a narrow range of possibilities.121 Con-
versely, a claim is physically indefinite when it is spatially imprecise. Spatial
imprecision may arise when claims use comparative terms or when the rela-
tionship between claim elements is ambiguous. Wide ranges of possibilities
118. The Federal Circuit considered a claim with four possible constructions in Dow
Chemical Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp. (Canada), which involved patents for plastics that “can
be made into films that can be down-gauged (made thinner) without losing strength.” 803
F.3d 620, 624 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The claim required calculating the slope of a new coefficient
that Dow created. Dow Chem., 803 F.3d at 625. The slope could have been calculated using any
one of four methods, and performing the four different calculations could lead to four differ-
ent results. Id. at 633–34. The four methods included three standard methods—the 10% se-
cant tangent method, the final slope method, and the most linear method—plus another
method invented by Dow’s expert witness. Id. at 633. The court not only found that the claims
were indefinite but also noted that they were “even more clearly indefinite than those in Teva.”
Id. at 635 (referring to Teva II, 789 F.3d 1335). Presumably, the court found that a one-in-four
chance of the chosen construction being correct was even less acceptable under the reasonable-
certainty standard than a one-in-three chance of the chosen construction being correct. The
uncertainty was not simply caused by “the inherent limitations of language.” Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2014). Rather, the applicant failed
to specify the claim’s metes and bounds. That shortcoming is fatal for a claim under the
requirement of linguistic definiteness.
119. See Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2129 (“[A]bsent a meaningful definiteness check . . .
patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims.”).
120. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996)).
121. As before, the claim’s ultimate validity depends not just on satisfying the requirement
of physical definiteness, but also on meeting the remaining requirements under the Patent Act.
See supra note 103. Physical definiteness is not a sufficient condition for validity, but it is a
necessary condition.
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that leave substantial uncertainty over claim elements also prevent claims
from satisfying the physical-definiteness requirement.
Physical definiteness differs from linguistic definiteness because physical
definiteness does not involve choosing between or among a discrete number
of claim constructions. Generally, physically indefinite claims are imprecise
because they leave open a partially unbounded range of possibilities. Chal-
lenges related to physical definiteness are less likely to arise than challenges
related to linguistic definiteness because all claims are expressed in words
and must contend with “the inherent limitations of language.”122 But not all
claims involve spatial precision. When claims do involve spatial precision,
however, they must be both linguistically and physically definite.
Spatial imprecision may arise when claims use comparative terms or
involve ambiguous arrangements of claim elements. Claims with compara-
tive terms might suffer from physical indefiniteness, but those comparative
terms may be acceptable if they are limited in scope. In Warsaw Orthopedic,
Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered a comparative term
under the post-Nautilus standard.123 The case involved spinal implants and
methods for performing spinal surgery.124 The disputed claim language
specified the following: “A translateral spinal implant . . . having a length
that is greater than one half the transverse width of the vertebrae.”125 Despite
the claim’s use of the comparative term “greater than,” the court held that
the claim was sufficiently definite.126 In understanding the claim, a
PHOSITA would be limited to a range of realistic possibilities because
human anatomy is fairly consistent. Although vertebrae are not all the same
size, the PHOSITA would have almost no uncertainty about the metes and
bounds of the claim. Accordingly, the claim in Warsaw Orthopedic met the
requirement of physical definiteness despite the presence of a comparative
term.
Ambiguous arrangements of claim elements may also give rise to physi-
cal indefiniteness, though not if a PHOSITA would be constrained in prac-
tice. The Federal Circuit’s reconsideration of the merits in Nautilus III
demonstrates how physical definiteness works.127 The patent involved a
heart-rate monitor for exercise equipment that users grip with their
hands.128 The claims specified electrodes having a “spaced relationship with
122. See Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2128.
123. 778 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 893 (2016) (mem.).
124. Warsaw Orthopedic, 778 F.3d at 1368.
125. Id. at 1370 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,860,973 col. 13 ll. 1–3).
126. Id. at 1371 (“The relative nature of the claim does not itself make it indefinite, and
NuVasive failed to establish . . . that human anatomy varies so significantly that reliance on the
well-known dimensions of human vertebrae makes the claims indefinite.”).
127. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus III), 783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
128. See Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus I), 715 F.3d 891, 893–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); see also supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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each other.”129 Despite that generic phrase, the court held that Biosig’s
claims were sufficiently definite under the reasonable-certainty standard.130
Given the device’s function, the court noted that “an ordinarily skilled arti-
san would be able to determine this language requires the spaced relation-
ship to be neither infinitesimally small nor greater than the width of a user’s
hands.”131 In other words, a PHOSITA would understand that the claim was
practically limited to a narrow range of physical possibilities in order for it
to function properly. The PHOSITA was constrained to a length varying by
only a few inches.132 Thus, the claim met the requirement of physical
definiteness.
These cases illustrate how claims might be physically definite even if
they use comparative terms or involve ambiguous relationships between
claim elements. Comparative terms are problematic, however, because they
set up comparisons between inventions in practice and elements in patent
claims; they do not clearly identify the outer edges of the claimed patent
rights. In other words, relative terms may place inventors in the Supreme
Court’s unacceptable “zone of uncertainty” because they are unbounded.133
Ambiguous spatial relationships are problematic for the same reason; they
leave inventors unsure of which arrangements are claimed and which do not
infringe. If such terms were acceptable under the definiteness requirement,
patent applicants would purposefully draft overly flexible claims given the
“powerful incentives to inject ambiguity.”134 Although the Federal Circuit
held that the claim terms were sufficiently definite in Warsaw Orthopedic135
and Nautilus III,136 one could imagine that the court might find the same
comparative term or ambiguous spatial relationship indefinite in another
context.
Under the proposed two-part framework, physical definiteness is just as
important as linguistic definiteness because both are required for a claim to
be sufficiently definite. A physically indefinite claim fails to meet the Su-
preme Court’s standard in Nautilus II because such a claim “fail[s] to in-
form, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of
the invention.”137 Similarly, a claim that is linguistically indefinite cannot
survive the Supreme Court’s higher standard. When a claim is open to mul-
tiple constructions and there is not one clearly correct construction, a
129. Nautilus III, 783 F.3d at 1376 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 col. 5 ll. 28–29).
130. Id. at 1382.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1382–83.
133. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Nautilus II), 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014)
(quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
134. Id.
135. Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 778 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 136
S. Ct. 893 (2016) (mem.).
136. Nautilus III, 783 F.3d at 1382.
137. Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
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PHOSITA would not be able to discern the claim’s scope with reasonable
certainty. In the post-Nautilus era, patent applicants should avoid the ambi-
guities associated with both linguistic and physical definiteness to draft
claims that will survive a challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
The two-part framework for definiteness presented in this Note should
not be mistaken as a proposal for courts to apply a rigid, two-prong test.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down the Federal Circuit’s rigid
tests in favor of more flexible standards.138 Plus, Nautilus II rejected the in-
soluble-ambiguity inquiry because it was too simplistic,139 and renewed in-
terest in the definiteness requirement stemmed from the Court’s abrogation
of the Federal Circuit’s mechanical application of the previous standard.140
Courts should continue to apply the definiteness requirement flexibly under
the Supreme Court’s standard from Nautilus II.
Additionally, this framework may not fully capture every definiteness
issue that might arise during patent prosecution or litigation. For example,
one could imagine a claim that does not implicate a physical relationship
and has only one possible construction but still remains ambiguous.141 In
this example, the underlying problem would not follow the pattern of the
other linguistic definiteness cases but would still be better considered an
issue involving linguistic definiteness.142 The two-part framework is meant
to encapsulate the most common problems that arise under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b), but it might not fit every problem that arises. Yet understanding
the definiteness requirement as two requirements for linguistic and physical
definiteness may be helpful for courts applying the flexible standard from
Nautilus II.
Once again, consider trying to follow a hypothetical recipe. When the
recipe tells you to “place one half of the separated eggs into a bowl” and
“discard the remaining half,” it suffers from linguistic indefiniteness. Those
terms could be construed in two ways—placing the yolks in the bowl and
discarding the whites or vice-versa. If a chef with ordinary culinary skills
cannot determine which interpretation is correct, it would be impossible for
her to proceed. Then, when the recipe instructs you to “place the pan a
138. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (striking
down the Federal Circuit’s test for enhanced damages); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014) (dismissing the Federal Circuit’s test for awarding
attorney’s fees as “unduly rigid”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (holding that the
Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test for patentable subject matter is “not the
sole test”); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (finding the Federal Circuit’s
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for obviousness “inconsistent” with the Court’s “ex-
pansive and flexible approach”).
139. See Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
140. Id. at 2130.
141. Imagine that the court in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. held that the term
“look and feel” had one construction but was still too ambiguous to define the claim’s metes
and bounds. See 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also supra notes 98–102 and accom-
panying text.
142. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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distance away from the center of the oven” for proper cooking, it suffers
from physical indefiniteness. The proper distance could be anywhere from a
couple of inches to half the width of the oven. If the distance makes a con-
siderable difference, then once again a chef with ordinary culinary skills will
not have enough information to continue following the recipe. These
problems could be fixed if the recipe unambiguously instructed you to
“place the separated yolks into a bowl” and to “place the pan six inches from
the center of the oven.” Like a chef who is selective about the recipes she will
accept, courts may reject claims that suffer from either of these problems.
Conclusion
At a time when companies aggressively assert their patent portfolios,
innovators face high incentives to ensure that their patents are valid. Liti-
gants may mount substantial challenges to patents suffering from potentially
fatal flaws. In particular, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the definiteness
requirement in Nautilus II brought about a renewed interest in that require-
ment. In the post-Nautilus era, courts evaluate claims to determine whether
those claims meet the Court’s higher bar of reasonable certainty. When
courts complete that analysis, they may consider whether claims meet the
requirements of linguistic and physical definiteness. By evaluating claims for
both types of definiteness, courts could help inventors, patent drafters, and
litigants avoid ambiguity while reaching more consistent results in definite-
ness cases.
